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A B S T R A C T
Both humans and non-human animals regularly encounter decisions involving risk and uncertainty. This paper
provides an overview of our research program examining risky decisions in which the odds and outcomes are
learned through experience in people and pigeons. We summarize the results of 15 experiments across 8 pub-
lications, with a total of over 1300 participants. We highlight 4 key ﬁndings from this research: (1) people
choose diﬀerently when the odds and outcomes are learned through experience compared to when they are
described; (2) when making decisions from experience, people overweight values at or near the ends of the
distribution of experienced values (i.e., the best and the worst, termed the “extreme-outcome rule”), which leads
to more risk seeking for relative gains than for relative losses; (3) people show biases in self-reported memory
whereby they are more likely to report an extreme outcome than an equally-often experienced non-extreme
outcome, and they judge these extreme outcomes as having occurred more often; and (4) under certain cir-
cumstances pigeons show similar patterns of risky choice as humans, but the underlying processes may not be
identical. This line of research has stimulated other research in the ﬁeld of judgement and decision making,
illustrating how investigations from a comparative perspective can lead in surprising directions.
1. Introduction
Humans are typically more risk seeking for losses than gains, and
this diﬀerence holds even when identical choices are framed as gains
and losses (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1981). Our line of research began by examining whether this classic
result from behavioural economics would also hold in pigeons, as had
been found with starlings (Marsh and Kacelnik, 2002) and capuchin
monkeys (Chen et al., 2006). Building from these ﬁndings led us to ‘re-
discover’ the description-experience gap (Ludvig and Spetch, 2011),
whereby people make diﬀerent risky choices when the odds and out-
comes are explicitly described vs. when those odds and outcomes are
learned from experience (Hertwig and Erev, 2009). Since then, our
journey has taken turns in other directions as we have sought to clarify
how past experiences inﬂuence future decisions, and nearly all of our
published work on this topic has been done in humans. Nevertheless,
this line of research has comparative cognition at the heart.
Consider the following scenario: Would you rather win $20 for sure,
or take a gamble with a 50% chance of winning $40 and a 50% chance
of winning nothing? Most people here would choose the guaranteed
win. When the same question is cast as losses, i.e., a guaranteed loss of
$20 or a 50% chance of losing $40, most people instead would choose
the gamble (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Now, how can you
‘ask’ a pigeon the same questions? Fig. 1A shows how, with people,
odds and outcomes in these risky decisions are typically conveyed by
means of language or visuals, such as a pie chart. Some studies with
non-human animals, such as with monkeys (Heilbronner and Hayden,
2013, 2016), have been able to convey described odds using visual
stimuli. Another approach is to instead convey odds and outcomes over
successive trials using an operant procedure and have the animal, or
human, learn the contingencies from their own experience. Fig. 1B
shows this alternate approach, when the decision problem is posed
through experienced odds and outcomes, rather than through described
ones. This choice procedure, involving pairs of door pictures, was used
in all of our published studies of decisions from experience in humans.
Studying decisions based on learned contingencies has a long his-
tory in operant conditioning research (e.g., Fantino, 1969; Herrnstein,
1961; Lea, 1979; Staddon and Motheral, 1978) and reﬂects the way
animals make choices in nature, but this approach is quite diﬀerent
from the way decision making is often studied in humans. Indeed, the
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famous studies of Kahneman and Tversky, among others, are based
primarily on research that involves asking people to make choices
based on explicitly described scenarios. This verbal accessibility may
add to the appeal of the research program, as even the readers ex-
perience the paradoxes, but often may not represent the types of de-
cision people regularly encounter in life. Moreover, as we will review
below, people make diﬀerent decisions based on descriptions than de-
cisions based on experience, even with the same odds and outcomes.
A few years prior to our initial work, evidence had begun to accu-
mulate showing that risk preferences in humans can change depending
on whether the choices are based on description or experience (Barron
and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004). Speciﬁcally, when choosing
between risky options that include rare events (i.e., 10% or lower),
people overweight the rare events if the decisions are described. When
the same decisions are based on repeated experience, however, people
choose as though they are underweighting the rare events. For example,
given a choice between a 5% chance at $100 and a guaranteed $5,
people will generally take the gamble when the problem is described
(overweighting the rare win), but take the sure thing when learned
from experience (underweighting the rare win).
This diﬀerence in the weighting of rare events when making deci-
sions based on described and experienced odds and outcomes has been
termed the description-experience gap (Hertwig and Erev, 2009). As
alluded to above, in our early work, we inadvertently uncovered an-
other type of description-experience gap that did not involve rare
events (Ludvig and Spetch, 2011). As with many advances in science
(e.g., Skinner, 1956), this discovery emerged serendipitously: our initial
investigations began with an attempt to re-create the framing eﬀects in
the human literature in pigeons (i.e., Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
After multiple failed attempts, we directly applied the procedure we
were using with pigeons to people, now failing to yield the expected
results in humans. This additional failure prompted us to directly pit
with people the pigeon-inspired approach (see Fig. 1B) against the
verbal approach drawn from the human literature (see Fig. 1A). With
this direct comparison of people’s risky choices when making decisions
from experience or description (Fig. 1A), we found the opposite pattern
of choices between these two approaches to conveying risk-related in-
formation. Fig. 1C shows how, as expected, people were more risk
seeking for losses than for gains in decisions from description, but,
contrary to the prevailing ﬁndings in the literature, they were more risk
seeking for gains than for losses in decisions from experience. This pi-
geon-inspired approach has become the bases of our numerous sub-
sequent studies with humans.
2. General procedure
As mentioned above, the decisions from experience that have be-
come the staple of our research on risky choice in humans (Fig. 1) were
inspired by the comparative approach to studying behavior. During the
task, people are only told that they should try to maximize their points
to earn money, but they are not told what will happen when choosing a
particular door. Instead, they learn from repeated trial-and-error ex-
perience about the odds and outcomes associated with each door. In all
of our studies thus far, risk preferences are assessed in terms of choices
between a ﬁxed option that always leads to a speciﬁc outcome and a
risky option that leads equally often to either a better outcome or a
worse outcome; the expected value of the ﬁxed and risky options are
equal, and there are no rare events. Typically, the learning set includes
two or more pairs of options that diﬀer in value (e.g., ﬁxed and risky
gain options and ﬁxed and risky loss options, or ﬁxed and risky high-
value options and ﬁxed and risky low-value options), and choices
among these options are intermixed.
Relative to other studies on risky decisions from experience in the
judgment and decision making (JDM) literature, our general procedure
involves a few novel features, inspired from the animal literature,
which are important to consider when comparing experimental designs.
Fig. 1. Illustration of task design for (A) decisions from description and (B) decisions from experience, along with (C) risk preferences at the end of the
experiment. Risk preference data is from Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch (2017); “DESC” and “EXP” refer to decisions from description and experience, respectively. Blocks
4 and 5 correspond to the 4th and 5th blocks of risky-choice trials within the experiment. Figure adapted from Madan et al. (2017).
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First, and of perhaps greatest importance, diﬀerent decisions, e.g., the
gain and loss decisions, are always inter-mixed within the same block of
trials. This key procedural factor is critical to our main ﬁnding (see
below) of greater risk seeking for relative gains than losses. In most
other JDM studies, separate decisions, often referred to as ‘problems’,
are presented one-after-another sequentially in blocks (e.g., Hertwig
et al., 2004). Along similar lines, in our studies, the side of the screen on
which the risky and safe options are presented is always counter-
balanced. Both of these procedural details are related to our initial
beginnings in the comparative cognition literature, where studies of
animals often counterbalance and inter-mix diﬀerent trial types. As
such, this unique perspective and bridging of the JDM and comparative
cognition approaches has been critical to our impact within the topics
of risky decision-making and gambling.
Another important feature of the tasks is that participants make
choices between a safe option and a risky option that can lead equi-
probably to two potential outcomes (i.e., 50% chance of each; see
Fig. 1), but the safe and risky options always have the same expected
value. For example, as shown in Fig. 1, people might choose between a
safe option of +20 points and a risky option that yields +40 points
50% of the time and 0 points otherwise; both these options have the
same expected value (+20). This equivalence is important as many
JDM studies present problems where one option, either risky or safe,
has a higher expected value (e.g., Camilleri and Newell, 2011; Hertwig
et al., 2004). For instance, people may be presented with a choice be-
tween a loss of 3 points with a 100% chance vs. a loss of 32 points with
a 10% chance. In these cases, from a reward-maximizing perspective,
there is a correct answer. When the safe and risky options have the
same expected value, however, choices on these decision trials are a
measure of risk preference that are not inﬂuenced by diﬀerences in
reward maximization. Although behavior in such cases does not in-
dicate the extent to which preference for risk would override diﬀer-
ences in expected value, the choices made when expected value is equal
should be sensitive to even mild variations in risk preference. Our
studies, however, do include catch trials that involve a decision be-
tween options of diﬀerent reward values, such as a gain vs. a loss, as a
manipulation check to assess whether participants have been paying
attention in the experiment and have successfully learned the outcome
contingencies.
Finally, to ensure that participants adequately sample the outcomes
associated with each option, some trials provide only a single option
that has to be chosen. These trials limit participants from only experi-
encing a small sample of outcomes that inadequately represents the
option, i.e., sampling biases. These single-choice trials avoid instances
where a risky option is initially unlucky and is then never subsequently
chosen, known as the hot-stove eﬀect (Denrell and March, 2001). Re-
latedly, in most of our studies, feedback is only given for the selected
options, termed partial feedback in the JDM literature (e.g., Camilleri
and Newell, 2011; Hertwig and Erev, 2009).
More generally, in all of these experiments, risky choices were
presented in blocks of trials, separated by a riddle to provide a brief
break. Participants were neither told how many trials were included in
each block, nor how many blocks comprised the experiment.
Experiments typically consisted of approximately 400–600 trials and
lasted 35–45minutes. Some experiments included an honorarium based
on task performance (i.e., total points earned), but others did not. When
an honorarium was paid, the point-to-money conversion diﬀered based
on task procedures (e.g., both gain and loss decisions, all gains, all
losses), but was not always told to participants. Nonetheless, the choice
eﬀects were robust across these procedural diﬀerences (see Figs. 6 and
7 below).
3. Key ﬁndings so far
Over the last few years, we have conducted a series of studies in-
vestigating risky decision making, with an emphasis on the role of
memory. Here we provide an overview and summary of these studies,
focusing on the bigger picture and relationship between the studies,
though each individual paper included additional hypotheses and
background not discussed here.
3.1. Biases in risky choice diﬀer for description and experience
A major ﬁnding from this work is that people make diﬀerent risky
choices in decisions from description versus decisions from experience,
even without rare events. In decisions from description—where odds
and outcomes are explicitly stated—people are more risk seeking for
losses than gains (Figs. 1A and C). In contrast, people are more risk
seeking for gains than losses in decisions from experience (Fig. 1B and
C; Ludvig and Spetch, 2011; Madan et al., 2017). Critically, this reversal
appears when both types of decision are made by the same participants
(in alternating blocks in the same session) and even involving the exact
same reward values. Whereas the pattern of risk preferences in deci-
sions from description is consistent with the extant literature (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the reversed pattern of preferences in
decisions from experience was novel and has become the dominant
focus of our line of research (Ludvig and Spetch, 2011).
3.2. Extreme outcomes are overweighted in choice
After the initial 2011 study, we conducted a series of experiments
with the goal of understanding the conditions that lead to these dif-
ferences in risk preferences across description and experience (Ludvig
et al., 2014a). For this series of studies, we focused solely on the de-
cisions-from-experience component of the task and replicated several
times the ﬁnding of more risk seeking for gains than losses (see Fig. 6).
This pattern was dependent on the relative range of the values ex-
perienced—participants were more risk seeking for relative gains than
losses, even when all of the outcomes presented were gains or losses.
For example, if people were given a set that consisted of high-value gain
decisions (e.g., ﬁxed +60 versus risky +40/+80) and low-value gain
decisions (e.g., ﬁxed +20 versus risky 0/+40), then people made more
risky choices for the high-value decisions (relative gains) than for the
low-value decisions (relative losses), such as in the choice behaviour
shown in Fig. 5.
To explain these ﬁndings, we proposed the extreme-outcome rule,
whereby the extreme outcomes—highest and lowest relative to the
range of values experienced—are overweighted in the decision-making
process. In the above example, 0 would be overweighted as the extreme
low value and +80 would be overweighted as the extreme high value.
People behave as though there is a distortion in their subjective prob-
abilities, not treating the two outcomes for the risky option as equi-
probable. Instead, people choose as though they subjectively attribute a
higher probability to the value that was either the best or worst out-
come within the experiment’s overall decision context (see also Lieder
et al., 2018).
Recently, we have further reﬁned the extreme outcomes as being
deﬁned by proximity to the edge of the experienced distribution. To do
so, we included in the decision set a second risky option that led to
values that neighbor the extreme values, but were not extreme them-
selves (Ludvig et al., 2018). In one of the experiments, there was a low-
value decision set (with values ranging from +5 to +45) and a high-
value decision set (with values ranging from +55 to +95). The ex-
tremes were thus +5 and +95. In the low-value set, there was a safe
option that led to +25, a risky extreme option that led to +5 (the
extreme) or +45 (non-extreme), as well as a risky neighbor option that
leads to +6 (near the extreme) or +44. As a control group, other
participants would instead have the risky neighbor option that leads to
+24 or +26. In this case, proximity to the edge determined what was
overweighted in the decision-making process. Both the extremes out-
comes (e.g., +5) and their nearby neighbours (e.g., + 6) were over-
weighted, but not the remote neighbours (e.g., +24). These results also
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provided robust evidence against an alternative hypothesis that dis-
criminability (due to distance from neighbouring outcomes) was the
key factor in determining what counted as an extreme outcome (e.g.,
Brown et al., 2007).
In another study, we directly manipulated the decision process by
hastening the pace of decisions. In that case, we added both a time
constraint on how long participants could take to make their choices
(i.e., time pressure) and shortened the inter-trial interval (Madan,
Spetch, & Ludvig, 2015). Participants were generally more risk seeking
when under time pressure, but the tendency to overweight the extreme
outcomes remained the same. This insensitivity of the extreme-outcome
eﬀect to time pressure suggest that the bias emerges early in the deci-
sion process, rather than through a process of extensive deliberation.
Here, by focusing on decisions from experience, we again extended the
existing literature on time pressure and risk, which had previously only
focused on decisions from description (e.g., Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981;
Kocher et al., 2013).
3.3. Extreme outcomes are overweighted in memory
Given that extreme outcome are indeed overweighted, an important
open question was what psychological mechanism was driving that
overweighting. In a related set of studies using an episodic-memory
approach, we had found that people better recalled stimuli associated
with both the highest and lowest reward values (Madan and Spetch,
2012; Madan et al., 2012). Based on this conﬂuence of results, we hy-
pothesized that the overweighting of extremes in choice might be due
to an overweighting of these outcomes in memory. Perhaps the most
extremes items are more memorable and are thus more likely to be
retrieved from memory and used to guide choice.
In Madan et al. (2014), we tested this conjecture directly, by adding
two memory tests after the risky-choice task. First, we presented pic-
tures of each of the doors (in random order) and asked participants to
type the ﬁrst outcome that came to mind for that door, which we
termed the ‘ﬁrst-outcome-reported’ test. This test assessed the avail-
ability of each outcome in memory. Next, we again presented each
door, but this time also presented all of the possible outcomes within
that experiment (e.g., −40, −20, 0, +20, +40); participants then
estimated the percentage of the time that the presented door led to each
of the possible outcomes, termed the ‘frequency-judgment’ test. This
test assessed whether there were distortions in the remembered fre-
quency of each outcome. Fig. 2 shows how participants demonstrated
similar biases in both tests—they were more likely to report the ex-
treme outcomes (in this example −40 and +40) and attributed higher
frequencies to these outcomes.
This pattern of memory results was further replicated in experi-
ments that included only gains, only losses, and decision sets with non-
overlapping values (Ludvig et al., 2018; Madan et al., 2014, 2017). The
overweighting of extremes in memory reports even occurred when the
blocks of decisions from experience were intermixed with blocks of
decisions from description with the same values (Madan et al., 2017).
Moreover, in each of these experiments there was a correspondence
between these memory biases and the risky decisions from experience.
Speciﬁcally, participants who reported the extreme value in the ﬁrst-
outcome-reported test for the relative gains were more risk seeking for
gain decisions, and those who reported the extreme value for the re-
lative losses were more risk averse for loss decisions, compared to those
people who reported the non-extreme values. With the frequency-
judgment test, there was again a similar, consistent pattern. People who
remembered a higher frequency for the relative gains were more risk
seeking for those gains, whereas those who remembered a higher fre-
quency for the relative losses were more risk averse for those losses.
As the memory tests of choice outcomes correlated with preferences
in the risky decisions from experience, we asked whether these memory
biases may be responsible for the diﬀerences between decisions from
description and experience (Madan et al., 2017). In a large-scale re-
plication of our initial description-experience study (Ludvig and Spetch,
2011), but with the memory tests added in, risky choice across the two
information formats (description and experience) was correlated.
People who were more risk seeking in decisions from description were
also relatively more risk seeking in decisions from experience. In ad-
dition, as above, the memory biases correlated with peoples’ risky
choice in decisions from experience. This relationship between memory
and decisions from experience, however, did not generalize to decisions
from description. There was no reliable correlation between memory
biases and risky choice in the described problems. As such, although
there are some commonalities to risky decision-making as a whole (e.g.,
see Frey et al., 2017), decisions from experience seem uniquely related
to these reward-related memory biases.
These studies only provided a correlational link between memory
and choice—to go beyond that, in a further study, we attempted to
establish more of a causal relation by subtly nudging participants to be
more risk seeking on speciﬁc trials through explicit memory cues
(Ludvig et al., 2015). Fig. 3 shows how, in this study, each reward value
was matched with an outcome-unique picture (Fig. 3A), unlike previous
studies (e.g., Fig. 1) where all gain reward values were associated with
the same pot of gold picture. This image was used to prime participants’
memories before speciﬁc decision trials in the last block of the ex-
periment (Fig. 3B). This manipulation successfully shifted choice: par-
ticipants were signiﬁcantly more likely to take the risky option after
being reminded of past winning outcomes, as shown in Fig. 3C. Such
winning cues have also been shown to shift risky choice in a gambling
task with rats (Barus and Winstanley, 2016). The reminders may have
served to increase the relative availability in memory of the distinct
Fig. 2. Memory results from the ﬁrst-out-
come reported and frequency judgment
tests. In the ﬁrst-outcome-reported test, parti-
cipants are shown each of the choice options
(i.e., doors) one at a time and asked to respond
with the ﬁrst outcome that came to mind. In
the frequency-judgment test, participants were
again shown each choice option and asked to
estimate the percentage of the time that the
outcome occurred. Figure adapted from Madan
et al. (2017).
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risk-related outcomes during the decision. As such, choice in these
decisions from experience may have some commonalities with the
availability heuristic that manifests in many choice situations (e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
3.4. Commonalities across species
The directly comparative angle to this research line has continued
throughout, and we have run several studies on risky choices in pi-
geons, looking for commonalities and diﬀerences with human choice. In
these studies, we have mostly used an open-ﬁeld procedure to have
pigeons choose a ‘door’ that had a set number of food cups behind it,
making the procedure analogous to our series of studies with humans
(Ludvig et al., 2014b). As with our usual procedure with humans, pi-
geons chose between pairs of safer and riskier options, which had
higher or lower-value possible outcomes. Fig. 4 shows a schematic of
the design as well as an illustration of the experimental set-up. Criti-
cally, Fig. 5 shows how, in an initial study, we found similar patterns of
risk preference across the two species—they were both more risk
seeking for the relative gains than the relative losses. This behavioural
convergence suggested that a similar mechanism may be involved in
risky decisions from experience in both species.
In a series of follow-up experiments, we further manipulated the
range of outcomes experienced by both people and pigeons (Pisklak
et al., 2018). Using both the same open-ﬁeld procedure and an operant
variation, when the outcomes included a zero (i.e., a no-reward option),
both pigeons and people showed more risk seeking for high-value than
low-value options (as in Ludvig et al., 2014b). However, when the
lowest outcome was non-zero (i.e., options always led to at least some
reward), then behavior diverged: People continued to show behaviour
congruent with the extreme-outcome rule with more risk seeking for
the high-value than the low-value options, but pigeons did not, as
though their behaviour was more driven by avoidance of the zero (no-
reward) outcome than a low extreme. This comparative divergence
presents a nuanced picture of the similarities and diﬀerence in the
mechanisms underlying risky decisions from experience in people and
pigeons. In other species, risky choice has been frequently examined
(see Weber et al., 2004 for a review) ranging all the way from bees (e.g.,
Anselme, 2018; Shaﬁr et al., 1999) to monkeys (e.g., Heilbronner and
Hayden, 2013, 2016), but, to the best of our knowledge, these studies
have yet to evaluate potential sensitivities to extreme outcomes (zero or
otherwise) in other non-human animals.
4. Overview of results
Having provided an overview of this programme of research, Fig. 6
provides a comprehensive summary of the decision sets and risky
choices in our published studies from this line of research. This sum-
mary chart covers 14 experiments across 7 publications, with over 1200
participants. (The priming study (Ludvig et al., 2015) is not included in
the ﬁgure as it did not include multiple risky options within the ex-
perimental design.) Accompanying this review paper, we have now
made the raw data available for almost all of these prior studies:
https://osf.io/eagcd/.
The extreme-outcome pattern is strikingly clear across studies. In
nearly every case where the extreme-outcome rule would be expected
to hold (in blue in the ﬁgure), there was more risk seeking for relative
gains and losses, but not where it would not be expected to apply (the
cases in orange). As would be the case with any random sampling
process, there are some exceptions, but the bulk of the published evi-
dence clearly supports the main claim (aligning with the rationale be-
hind a p-curve analysis; Simonsohn et al., 2014). Although we sum-
marize the key results of our prior experiments across several
publications here, we only make qualitative comparisons between these
results, given recent demonstrations that internal meta-analyses can
problematically overstate the strength of evidence for an eﬀect (Ueno
et al., 2016; Vosgerau et al., 2018).
The summary of all procedures and results at once reveals several
higher-level ﬁndings that were not immediately apparent in the in-
dividual studies. For instance, though people are consistently more risk
seeking for relative gains than losses, i.e., the extreme-outcome rule,
this eﬀect is larger in magnitude when all of the options in the decision
set are either gains or losses, in comparison to when the decision sets
involve a mixture of both gains and losses. We have suggested that this
may be the case because absolute gains and losses are easy to categorize
and categorical memory may overshadow memory for the exact values
Fig. 3. Overview of the priming study, (A) outcome contingencies, (B) trial procedure, and (C) risk preference results. Panel A illustrates that unique pictures
were associated with each outcome; panel B shows these outcomes in a single trial procedure, as well as an outcome picture being presented preceding the choice, as
a prime. Figure adapted from Ludvig et al. (2015).
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(Ludvig et al., 2018). When all the values are either gains or losses,
people may attend more to the speciﬁc values and be more sensitive to
the extremes of the range. The ﬁgure also makes apparent that risk
preferences were rarely much above 50%, even for high-valued gains;
instead, in these decisions from experience, we typically ﬁnd strong risk
aversion for the relative losses and risk neutrality or weak risk pre-
ference for the relative gains.
Fig. 7 provides a parallel summary of the memory results from all
the studies that included memory tests. For the ﬁrst-outcome-reported
test, results indicate the proportion of participants who reported the
more extreme value of the decision set, relative to all of those who
responded with a ‘valid’ outcome (i.e., an outcome that was associated
with the risky option, not an ‘other’ outcome). Frequency judgment
results are treated similarly, showing the relative proportion of re-
sponses for the more extreme value. As can be observed even within the
individual studies, the ﬁrst-outcome measure demonstrates more pro-
nounced biases than the frequency-judgement test. This overview,
however, makes apparent a few interesting consistencies across ex-
periments. In particular, the bias to remember extreme outcomes
appears to be consistently larger for outcomes associated with loss and
low-value decisions than for outcomes associated with gain and high-
value decisions, in both the ﬁrst-outcome-reported tests and the fre-
quency-judgment tests.
There is also an indication that decision sets that are within one
domain (i.e., all gains or all losses) lead to stronger memory biases than
instances where both gains and losses are used. This pattern may sug-
gest that diﬀerences in outcome magnitude are more salient than dif-
ferences in reward valence. This incidental ﬁnding was previously
suggested in Ludvig et al. (2018, p. 12), as “attending to category in-
formation (i.e., gain or loss) may overshadow learning of speciﬁc out-
comes.” The summary provided here provides more direct quantitative
evidence for this result. Nonetheless, further research would be needed
to test this mechanism directly.
5. Current lines of investigation
There are several important open questions that we are attempting
to answer in ongoing studies. For example, we have been pushing on
Fig. 4. Open-ﬁeld procedure. (A) Testing arena for pigeons. Pigeons entered from the start box and chose which half of the arena to enter through guillotine doors.
(B) Reward contingencies. (C) Photo of setup. Figure adapted from Ludvig et al. (2014b).
Fig. 5. Risk preference results from com-
parative study for (A) pigeons and (B) hu-
mans. Bar plots (right) show average risk
choices over ﬁnal two blocks of the experi-
ment. Figure adapted from Ludvig et al.
(2014b). For pigeons, the high-value decisions
corresponded to a choice between ﬁxed 3 vs.
risky 2 or 4 food cups; low-value decisions
corresponded to ﬁxed 1 vs. risky 0 or 2 food
cups (as shown in Fig. 4B). For humans, the
high-value decision corresponded to 60 vs. 40
or 80 points; low-value decisions corresponded
to 20 vs. 0 or 40 points.
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the comparative angle to better assess the degree to which the me-
chanisms overlap or diverge across species. To that end, we have run
several further studies with pigeons, including with an operant
touchscreen procedure, to allow for closer matched comparisons be-
tween species (see above; Pisklak et al., 2018). In addition, to more
closely link our work with the existing JDM literature, we are studying
the impact of the extreme-outcome rule when decisions are not inter-
mixed or when some outcomes occur only rarely as is typically studied
in decisions from experience (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Whereas the
extreme-outcome rule is based on the extremity of the reward values
experienced within the decision context, the frequency (or infrequency)
of these outcomes is not considered, as our procedures have always
Fig. 6. Comprehensive summary of risky choices
in our previously published papers. For decisions,
“X” denotes the condition with extreme values, “NX”
denotes non-extremes, “Ng” denotes neighbour va-
lues. “Desc” and “Exp” denote decisions from de-
scription and experience, respectively; when not
stated otherwise, all decisions were made from ex-
perience. Outcome values for the risky gain and
high-value options are shown in green and upward
triangles, with the corresponding safe option shown
as black circles; risky losses and low-value options
are shown in red and downward triangles, with the
corresponding safe option shown as a white square;
other outcome values are shown in gray markers.
The proportions of risky choices for these decisions,
P(Risky), are shown correspondingly in green, red,
or gray. Diﬀerences in risky choices between pairs of
decisions are shown in the Diﬀ(P(Risky)) section.
Pairings where the extreme-outcome rule is thought
to apply are shown in blue; other pairings are shown
in orange. Studies are ordered chronologically. Error
bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. (Note that error
bars in some previously published ﬁgures were
SEMs.).
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used risky options that could only lead to two, equiprobable outcomes.
Another fundamental question that remains unanswered is what
deﬁnes the decision context. As shown in Fig. 6, the inclusion of a
higher or lower set of values within an experiment can strongly inﬂu-
ence risky choices on a speciﬁc decision set. For instance, for the exact
same decision between 100%+20 points and an option that yields 50%
+40 points or 50% 0 points, people are more risk seeking when the
other outcomes in the decision set involve losses than when the other
decision set involves higher-valued gains. In current work, we have
borrowed from the memory literature to instantiate distinct contexts
within a single experiment that provide diﬀerent decision sets (Madan
et al., 2018). We have recently undertaken a series of experiments to
examine how visual and temporal contexts involving distinct decision
sets may aﬀect the extreme-outcome rule.
While we have ongoing work to further this line of research, others
have also recognized the utility of this approach to decisions from ex-
perience and begun to use similar paradigms with their own adjacent
research questions in mind. For example, Konstantinidis et al. (in press)
used the same general procedure, but manipulated the magnitude of the
gains and losses. Whereas many of our studies have used choices be-
tween 100% 20 points vs 50% 40 points, Konstantinidis and colleagues
examined choices across four orders of magnitude, with the safe option
being either 2, 20, 200, or 2000. They found that the extreme-outcome
rule, greater risk seeking for relative gains than losses, was largest in
magnitude for the smaller reward values and diminished when the re-
ward values were in the thousands.
In a further extension, St-Amand et al. (2018) used a risky-choice
task based on our procedure, but preceded it with either an episodic-
speciﬁcity or a general-impressions induction task. The former task was
designed to increase participants’ attention to speciﬁc episodic details
(e.g., Madore et al., 2014; Madore and Schacter, 2016); in contrast, the
latter task asked participants to focus on ‘gist’-like impressions. Inter-
estingly, St-Amand et al. found that the general impressions induction
task led to decreased risk taking and no bias in memory recall. In
contrast, participants given either the episodic-speciﬁcity induction
task or no induction task had comparable risk preference patterns and
biased memory recall. More generally, the extreme-outcome rule has
also found support with varied designs (Cox and Dallery, 2018; Le
Pelley et al., in press; Wispinski et al., 2017).
Recent theoretical accounts of risky choice and the underlying
sampling process have also incorporated the ﬁndings of this line of
work (e.g., Gershman and Daw, 2017; Lieder et al., 2018). For example,
in a recent theoretical analysis, Lieder et al. (2018) developed a rational
model of decision-making wherein experienced outcomes were
weighted by both their probability and their extremity. Their model
provided a strikingly strong ﬁt to our pattern of empirical results (e.g.,
from Madan et al., 2014), while also explaining other aspects of the
description-experience gap. They further showed that such an over-
weighting of extremes, as we have repeatedly observed, actually re-
ﬂects a rational use of limited cognitive resources. Their key idea is
that, with a limited number of samples to draw from memory, over-
emphasizing the most extreme outcome leads to less variance in utility
estimates and better overall performance.
6. Conclusion
Across 8 publications involving over 1300 participants, we have
shown how the extreme-outcome rule, in which people are more risk-
seeking for relative gains than for relative losses, is extremely robust
and replicable. We have also shown, however, that this eﬀect is
Fig. 7. Summary of memory results from previously published risky decision-making studies.Memory results are shown as proportions of valid responses, i.e.,
not including responses from participants for outcomes that did not occur for the respective risky outcome. “X” denotes the condition with extreme values, “NX”
denotes non-extremes, “Ng” denotes neighbour values. Outcome values for the risky gain and high-value options are shown in green and upward triangles, with the
corresponding safe option shown as black circles; risky losses and low-value options are shown in red and downward triangles, with the corresponding safe option
shown as a white square; other outcome values are shown in gray markers. Studies are ordered chronologically. Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. (Note that
error bars in some previously published ﬁgures were SEMs.).
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dependent on key procedural features. The extreme-outcome rule only
manifests when outcomes are learned through experience rather than
being described, and it requires the intermixing of choices involving
relative gains and losses within the same context. For example, the
absolute level of risk preference for a choice between a ﬁxed option
leading to +20 points and a risky option leading to either +10 or +30
points, depends on whether the choice occurs in the context of other
choices that involve losses or other choices that involve higher valued
gains (see Madan et al., 2018).
One of the key ﬁndings in this research is that the extremes in a
range of values are overweighted in both memory and choice. This
result may represent another example of a general ﬁnding that values at
the ends of a distribution have a privileged status. For example, with
serially presented items, the ﬁrst and last items experienced are better
remembered (i.e., primacy and recency eﬀects; Murdock, 1962; Wright
et al., 1985). Humans also recall items associated with the highest and
lowest values in a value-association task (Madan and Spetch, 2012). In
perceptual discrimination tasks such as judging line-length, people are
more accurate with values that fall at the ends of the distribution than
for values in the middle of the distribution (e.g., Moon et al., 2015). It
may be that the edges of a distribution across numerous dimensions
have ecological relevance and command attention because they provide
the boundary conditions for an experience. For example, in a foraging
context, it may be important to track not only the overall rate of return,
but also the best and worst returns, in order to learn the range of
possible outcomes for a particular decision.
There are many questions remaining about the generality of the
extreme-outcome eﬀect. From a comparative perspective, more re-
search is needed to determine to what degree the processes underlying
the eﬀect in humans are shared with other animals. Although our ﬁrst
comparative study showed striking similarities in the pattern of choice
behavior between pigeons and humans (Ludvig et al., 2014b), follow-up
work with a wider range of outcome values suggest that diﬀerences
may exist in the mechanisms, with pigeons being particularly sensitive
to zero values (Pisklak et al., 2018). Research on other species is needed
to determine the species generality of sensitivity to extreme outcomes
or to zero values. Research on humans using consummatory reinforcers,
as opposed to secondary non-consumable reinforcers, such as points or
money, may also help to make stronger species comparisons (see
Hayden and Platt, 2009). Though it is more diﬃcult to probe for
memory recall in animals, creative procedures are being developed in
other non-human species (e.g., Crystal, 2009; Eacott and Easton, 2007).
Whether the extreme-outcome rule would generalize to other features
of rewards besides magnitude is also an important future research
question. For example, would people or other animals overweight the
extremes of delays to an outcome, the number of responses required to
obtain an outcome, or the quality of the outcome (e.g., palatability of
food)?
On the theoretical side, important questions also remain about how
best to model the choice process in decisions from experience (e.g., Erev
et al., 2017; Lieder et al., 2018). One emerging theme is that people
seem to be sampling from their memories of past outcomes, which can
eﬀectively percolate biases in memory into choice (e.g., Shadlen and
Shohamy, 2016; Stewart, 2009). A similar sample-based proposal has
recently been forwarded in the comparative literature, to account for
many challenging phenomena in animal learning, such as spontaneous
recovery and latent inhibition (Ludvig et al., 2017). A second theme
highlights the important role of decision context—options are always
evaluated relative to others in the same context, but what deﬁnes the
context is still underdetermined (Bornstein and Norman, 2017).
This line of research began with a straightforward comparative
question and blossomed into a line of research that has implications for
models of decision making in humans and other animals. Thus, this
research provides another example of how the comparative approa-
ch—in which animals must be ‘asked’ using behavioral methods and
learning by experience is emphasize—can be fruitfully merged with
other disciplines to provide a richer understanding of important cog-
nitive processes (e.g., see Twyman et al., 2013).
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